- No categories
66. Eric B. Rasmusen et al., Naked Exclusion: Reply, 90 Am. Econ. Rev. 310, 310 (2000); see also z.B. 15. Nov. tr., supra Note 2, at 49 (Marvel); id.
to 114 (Calkins); Joseph Farrell, Deconstructing Chicago on Exclusive Dealing, 50 Antitrust Bull. 465, 476 (2005); Jonathan M. Jacobson – Scott A. Sher, “No Economic Sense” Makes No Sense for Exclusive Dealing, 73 Antitrust L.J. 779, 791 (2006) (“I]t now is indisputable that in many contexts exclusive trade can be used in a way that . . . allows the defendant to derive benefits from the agreement that far exceed the costs associated with it.” Eric B. Rasmusen et al., Naked Exclusion, 81 Am.
Econ. Rev. 1137, 1140 (1991); Ilya R. Segal – Michael D. Whinston, Naked Exclusion: How, 90 Am. Econ. Rev. 296, 307 (2000) (noting that while many buyers have already entered into exclusivity agreements, a monopoly “does not have to pay much” to induce other buyers to agree). Exclusive trade also takes place between sellers and consumers, for example.
B when a consumer agrees to buy all of their requirements for a particular product from a single supplier. Companies may agree to enter into only contracts that prohibit one party from dealing with others (5) or the exclusive trade agreement may take other forms. For example, if a seller adopts guidelines that effectively require customers to deal only with them. In other words, exclusive trade “encourages the supplier itself to provide more support to distributors by eliminating the so-called “inter-parasitism effect”; Suppliers will strengthen their distributors because other brands cannot “freely” drive the supplier`s investment by selling on the same distributors. (82) In British politics, “exclusive trade” prior to the introduction of secret voting by the Ballot Act of 1872 was a means by which those who did not vote could put pressure on traders, etc. – a policy that any trader who voted against the popular candidate would lose the custom of non-voters of a contrary conviction. The practice was similar to a modern boycott; it has been effective for radicals in some constituencies, and they have therefore been cautious about any offer or attempt to introduce secret voting before a substantial extension of the franchise. Most exclusive commercial contracts are beneficial because they promote marketing support for the manufacturer`s brand. By becoming an expert on a manufacturer`s products, the distributor is encouraged to specialize in promoting that manufacturer`s brand.
This may include offering special services or equipment that cost money, such as an attractive business. B, trained salespeople, long hours of work, an inventory of available products or a quick warranty service. The cost of providing some of these amenities to consumers before the sale of the product, which cannot be recovered if the consumer leaves without buying anything, can hardly be passed on to customers in the form of a higher retail price. For example, the consumer may take a “free trip” on the value services offered by a retailer, and then purchase the same product at a lower price than another retailer that does not offer expensive equipment, such as a discount store or online store. If the full-service distributor loses enough revenue, it will no longer be able to offer the services at any given time. If these services were truly useful, in the sense that the combined product and services led to higher sales for the manufacturer than the product alone would have benefited, the result will be a loss to both the manufacturer and the consumer.